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 This study examines an 1887 lynching in Pickens County, South Carolina, in which a 
black mob lynched a white man for the rape and murder of a black girl.  Two members of 
the mob, both African American, were eventually convicted, but a massive petition 
campaign led the goernor to pardon them.  The study relies largely on coroner’s inquests 
for the murder victim and the lynching victim, court records, and newspaper articles.  It 
suggests that the anomalous nature of this lynching prompted many people to consider 
and debate exactly what justified lynching and what role race was to play in those 
justifications.  Since the lynching occurred at the very point when lynching victims were 
becoming overwhelmingly African American men, the insights provided into 
contemporary views on lynching are all the more valuable. 
 
 
‘Lynch Law Reversed: The Rape of Lula Sherman, the Lynching of Manse Waldrop, and the 
Debate Over Lynching in the 1880s’ 
 
 
 Around midnight on the unusually cold evening of 30 Dec. 1887, Constable David E. 
Garvin drove his buggy over the railroad tracks in Central, South Carolina, heading north along 
the hilly road to Pickens.  On the seat next to him, arms tied, sat Manse Waldrop, identified that 
afternoon at the coroner’s inquest as the man who had raped and killed Lula Sherman, the 
fourteen-year old daughter of a sharecropper.  Before the buggy made it a mile down the road, 
men drifted out from the darkness, grabbing the mule’s harness.  Garvin tried to get the buggy 
turned around and moving back toward the relative safety of the hotel at Central, but it was too 
late.  The men had grasped Waldrop and dragged him from the buggy, into the woods. 
 The story of the lynching of Manse Waldrop can be told in such great detail because of 
an unusual wealth of source material, one of several factors making this case unique and richly 
deserving of study.  In addition to the usual newspaper stories describing the lynching, this study 
rests on transcriptions of the coroner’s inquests of both the lynching victim and the victim of the 
precipitating rape and murder.  The sworn testimony of over two dozen witnesses contained in 
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these two documents make it possible to construct a detailed timeline for the hours between the 
time a coroner’s jury convened to determine who raped Lula Sherman and the time her father 
and his neighbors lynched Waldrop.  These coroner’s inquests were later transcribed at the 
request of the governor, who was reviewing the many petitions he had received requesting 
clemency for two of the lynchers convicted of murder.  Along with the coroner’s inquest 
transcriptions, the governor received dozens of petitions and letters bearing the signatures of 
thousands of citizens, overwhelmingly asking that the lynchers be pardoned for their crime.  The 
reason this case gathered so much attention is indicated in the headline one newspaper gave the 
story: ‘Lynch Law Reversed.’  What was reversed–and what makes the lynching of Manse 
Waldrop such a rare opportunity for the historian interested in understanding racial violence in 
the New South–was the racial identities of the parties.  Lula Sherman was black, Manse Waldrop 
was white, and the men in the mob who lynched him were black. 
 
 Historians have seldom told the story of Manse Waldrop because it can find no place 
within the broader narratives of the historiography of lynching.  According to the best statistics 
on lynching available at this time, Waldrop was one of four white men lynched by black mobs 
between 1882 and 1940.1  When George Brown Tindall briefly noted the case in his 1952 study 
South Carolina Negroes, 1877-1900, he described it as ‘one unusual case,’ and the story figured 
as a chapter in E. Don Herd, Jr.’s The South Carolina Upcountry, where it was described as ‘the 
most unusual lynching and resulting court trial in the history of South Carolina.’   Even the most 
thorough student of lynching in South Carolina, Terence Finnegan, regarded it in much the same 
light.  In a discussion of violence among white yeomen in upstate South Carolina, Stephen A. 
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West provided the fullest account yet of the Waldrop lynching to show that the prosecution of 
these lynchers occurred ‘under circumstances that were clearly exceptional.’  All these previous 
accounts of Manse Waldrop’s lynching treat it as an anomaly, a bizarre exception to the 
archetype of a white mob lynching a black man for an alleged sexual assault on a white woman.2  
Waldrop’s story does not fit into this historiography, and seeing why it does not can help us 
transcend the old tropes of lynching historiography. 
 Historians’ studies of lynching have followed a narrative initially set by activists 
concerned with ending lynching.  Lynching scholarship began as an urgent attempt to come to 
grips with a phenomenon that was out of control, threatening law and order and claiming 
hundreds of victims a year.  Journalists and activists such as Ida B. Wells-Barnett or scholars 
such as James Elbert Cutler wrote early studies of lynching around the turn of the twentieth 
century in order to understand lynching as it was happening and stop it.  The NAACP sponsored 
an important survey of lynching in 1919, and sociologists used the evolving principles of social 
science to deal with this southern problem.  Nearly all histories of lynching rely on records kept 
by the NAACP, the Tuskegee Institute, and the Chicago Tribune–all institutions which hoped 
that publicity could help end lynching.  When historians began to give sustained attention to 
lynching, the works they were building upon all came out of the antilynching movement.3 
 As useful as the work of Ida B. Wells-Barnett or Arthur F. Raper may be in 
understanding contemporary responses to lynching, the antilynching perspective of all early 
studies of lynching prioritized certain ways of analyzing lynching over others.  In the early 
1890s, the nature of lynching did change and a phenomenon that had once targeted both white 
and black victims was reoriented into the most extreme means of enforcing the laws and customs 
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of segregation against African American victims.  As historian Christopher Waldrep has recently 
demonstrated, an archetypal lynching narrative emerged, telling a simple story with stock 
characters.  A bestial black man committed a sexual assault against a pure white woman, and the 
enraged white men who could not wait for the delays and uncertainties of judicial procedure 
meted out a harsh but deserved penalty.  Activists starting with Wells-Barnett went to great 
lengths to point out that this story served as a cover for many more complicated situations.  
White men, Wells-Barnett argued, actually lynched black men for many reasons besides 
allegations of rape, and even in those cases, the rape allegations remained unproven since no trial 
was ever held to establish the truth.  When Wells-Barnett set out to explain how lynching 
worked, she sought to get behind the ‘black beast rapist’ myth that most whites used to justify 
lynching, but in arguing against this myth, she still took it as the center of her analysis.  If white 
people could see past the lies, reasoned antilynching activists, then even the ones who might 
approve of lynching black rapists would oppose most lynchings since most lynchings did not 
actually involve rape.  A little later, sociologists worked to find scientific principles that would 
explain lynching.  The most successful sociological explanation of lynching would be the one 
that could be applied successfully to the largest number of lynchings.  Competition for resources, 
the educational level of a population, or even the season of the year might be a generalizable 
explanation for why lynchings happened when and where they did.4 
 While the work of antilynching activists and sociologists may have helped understand the 
dynamics of why lynchings occurred and how they might be stopped, it simultaneously impeded 
a solid historical understanding of lynching by essentializing the phenomenon and failing to 
account for its development and change over time.  Antilynching activists determined to get to 
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the ‘real’ reasons for lynchings had to get past the smokescreens that southern whites threw up to 
justify the practice, but one effect of this was that scholars of lynching have not looked carefully 
enough at these justifications, assuming they were universally disingenuous.  For example, one 
of the first modern histories of lynching was Jacquelyn Dowd Hall’s 1979 Revolt Against 
Chivalry, which argued that lynching was a means for white men to control not just black men 
and women, but white women as well.  While Hall’s insight is certainly correct and has served to 
inspire much further work on the subject, it still fits in the narrative established by Wells-Barnett 
and other early antilynching activists: though white men may have claimed that they lynched 
black men as retaliation for sexual assaults, those claims are only a distraction from the real 
reasons for lynching.5 
 Another effect of the antilynching roots of lynching scholarship is that historians have 
never quite known what to do with lynchings that do not fit into the archetypal pattern.  Studies 
of lynching nearly always segregate their analysis of non-white mobs and non-black and non-
male victims.  W. Fitzhugh Brundage’s study of lynching in Virginia and Georgia devoted a 
separate chapter to situations ‘when white men merit lynching.’  Crystal Feimster’s study of 
women and lynching worries at the edges of the archetype by considering white women 
participating in the lynching of black men and white men who lynched black women, but even 
Feimster focuses on ‘the rape myth [that] shaped the narrative of lynching into a cautionary tale 
for blacks and women, a warning that the New South could be a dangerous place when they 
transgressed the narrow boundaries of race and gender.’  The essentialized story of lynching and 
the desire to get below the surface to the deeper meaning remains intact.6 
 This study uses a lynching which defies the archetype in some ways yet follows it in 
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others to open a discussion of lynching that does not divine the deeply hidden motives for the 
lynching but instead dwells on the arguments over lynching this atypical event provoked.  More 
clearly than in most cases, we know who lynched Manse Waldrop and why; what is confusing in 
this situation is how the lynching would be justified or condemned.  No one could argue that the 
black men who lynched Manse Waldrop had as their hidden agenda the desire to enforce an 
oppressive racial hierarchy.  In the debates over whether the lynching was justifiable and what 
should happen to the lynchers, we have the opportunity to see how people on all sides of the 
evolving discussion about lynching thought about the practice.  Reporters and editors discussed 
the case in dozens of newspaper articles.  Grand juries worked to decide who was to blame for 
what.  Average citizens signed carefully argued petitions explaining how they thought the case 
should be handled, and more prominent citizens pondered the dilemmas in personal letters to the 
governor.  All these opinions and ideas form a dense archive in the discourse surrounding 
lynching at this time. It is all the better that the lynching occurred just at the point when the 
practice of lynching itself was becoming more purely a means of racial control. 
 The unusual nature of the Waldrop lynching also encourages us to consider it within the 
context of other historiographies that often go overlooked in lynching studies based on the 
antilynching tradition.  Since Waldrop was lynched because he raped a black girl, we can 
consider this case as one of many responses by African Americans against white violence.  A 
generation ago, Herbert Shapiro surveyed this field and noted that some black leaders called for 
violent resistance to lynching, though he generalized too broadly when he claimed, ‘Blacks have 
fought against those who would oppress them, but they have not organized lynch mobs.’  More 
recent work has described a broader range of responses that included evasion and ‘everyday 
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resistance’ as well as violence.  In reconsidering black resistance to Jim Crow, Robin D. G. 
Kelley argued that while the black middle class might have followed the dictates of Booker T. 
Washington, the working class was more inclined to abandon accommodation for whatever form 
of resistance they could get away with.  Going beyond the ‘everyday resistance’ Kelley 
documented, W. Fitzhugh Brundage suggested that historians pay more attention to the ‘roar on 
the other side of silence,’ the ever-present possibility that white violence against African 
Americans could be met with violence.  Even scholars of the Civil Rights Movement such as 
Timothy B. Tyson have argued that we need to consider the role of ‘armed self-reliance’ along 
with nonviolence in advancing civil rights.7 
 The fact that Lula Sherman, the rape victim in this lynching case, was black rather than 
white ties this case to the historiography of sexual violence, and especially sexual violence 
against black women, in a way that a study of an archetypal lynching usually would not.  Had 
Lula Sherman been white, there would probably have been no debate over whether she was an 
innocent victim and whether her attacker deserved to be shot and hanged by the side of the road.  
But  racist assumptions about gender, power, and sexuality guaranteed that along with discussing 
the finer points of justifying lynching, observers of this case would have to consider what they 
thought about rape.  The historian thus has the advantage of gaining some insight into one of the 
most frustratingly dark corners of historical experience in the nineteenth-century South, the 
sexual assault and exploitation of black women by white men.8 
 
 ‘Central’ might seem an unlikely name for a town in the foothills of the Blue Ridge, but 
that is exactly what it was, lying halfway between Charlotte and Atlanta on the Atlanta and 
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Richmond Air Line, a few miles from the former home of John C. Calhoun.  Started in the early 
1870s by Tom Scott of the Pennsylvania Railroad, the Atlanta and Richmond Air Line promised 
to open up South Carolina’s upper piedmont to commercial development.  Construction of the 
railroad pushed southwest from Charlotte into South Carolina, and in 1873 the track was 
completed and the line opened.  Central provided a place for engines to be changed out and to 
take on coal and water.  A number of houses and a post office sprang up, and a hotel opened.9 
 Leaving the perspective of the train tracks, Central and its railroad had an important 
effect on the part of Pickens County it traversed.  Railroads built after the Civil War accelerated 
a shift to cotton production that had begun in the 1850s.10  Along with quickening the 
agricultural economy, the railroad itself in Central provided opportunities not available in 
outlying towns or even in other railroad towns that lacked Central’s railroad infrastructure. In 
particular, these railroad jobs gave local African Americans opportunities to earn cash wages and 
escape the tightening grip of sharecropping.  In 1886, in response to a wave of railroad strikes 
across the country led by the Knights of Labor, the railroad decided to begin hiring black 
workers in preference to white workers for ‘all subordinate positions in the shops and on the 
road.’  Not only was black labor cheaper than white, but railroad managers hoped that black 
workers would be less likely to join strikes.  The policy was rescinded in February 1887 after 
complaints by the local Knights of Labor and the Firemen’s Brotherhood, but it seems likely that 
some of the lynch mob members who worked at the railroad shops got their jobs at this time.11 
 By the late 1880s, the practice of lynching itself was in flux.  It was not until the late 
1880s that lynching came to be associated in the public mind primarily with white mobs 
responding to sexual assaults by black men on white women, assaults that had appropriated the 
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term ‘outrage’ from the Reconstruction-era lynchings.12  Joel Williamson has argued that this 
transition, which he dated quite specifically to a rape scare in 1889, was part of a broader 
transition in the South from a ‘Conservative’ racism associated with the aristocratic Redeemers 
to a ‘Radical’ racism associated with a younger generation of political insurgents who based their 
power on control of white labor more than control of black labor.  By the early 1890s, lynching 
was clearly not something which could just as easily befall a white transgressor as a black 
transgressor.13  Lynching was culturally coded by race: a weapon in the arsenal of white 
supremacy to be used against African Americans as necessary. 
 In South Carolina, lynching itself was nothing new.  Lynchings had occurred during the 
Civil War, and Reconstruction saw dozens of attacks which should properly be categorized as 
lynchings.  In 1871, a group of Ku Klux Klansmen lynched a dozen African American members 
of the state militia who had been arrested in Union County on suspicion of murder. In nearby 
York County, Klansmen lynched Tom Roundtree and Jim Williams, both leaders in their 
communities.14  In the years between 1882 and 1887, there were at least fifteen lynchings, and 
nearly all the victims had been black men killed for rape or murder.15 
 The lynching of Manse Waldrop came at a time of transition in South Carolina and in the 
South as a whole.  The debate that swirled around this puzzling situation showed the inner 
workings of some minds as they struggled to explain an anomalous situation in terms that would 
clarify for themselves and for the future exactly what the practice of lynching was all about.  
Was it an equal-opportunity sanction that a community might use against the worst offenders 
without regard to the colors of the parties involved?  Or was it a quasi-legal means of enforcing 
white supremacy and thus off-limits to African Americans, no matter how heinous the crime they 
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sought to avenge?  The answers blacks and whites would suggest to these questions are 
revealing.  I do not mean to argue that the Waldrop case was particularly influential.  I have no 
evidence that it shaped larger debates on lynching or made a particularly wide impression in its 
time or later.  What the Waldrop case does is raise questions about race and violence that remain 
as vexing to historians in the twenty-first century as they were to South Carolinians in the 
nineteenth. 
 
 Lula Sherman sat alone at home on the morning after Christmas, minding her younger 
sister.  When she heard the footsteps in the yard and the knock on the door, she probably thought 
it was a neighbor, or perhaps the landlord, Mr. Miller.  She was a bit apprehensive to find a 
strange white man with a dark beard asking to speak to her father.  Cato Sherman was gone, 
though, out working or taking advantage of the lull after Christmas to visit relatives.  Her mother 
had left that morning to attend a funeral, and when the white man insisted on waiting for her 
parents to return, Lula’s nervousness turned to fear.  And then he raped her.  Afterwards, alarmed 
that Lula’s condition would tell the tale of what had happened, he forced her to swallow some 
medicine.  He grabbed a nearby handful of cotton and pushed it inside her to stanch the bleeding.  
The bearded man pulled on his jeans jacket, picked up his gun, and walked away, disappearing 
over the hill a few moments later.16 
 Three days later, Delia Sherman was in a panic as she saw her fourteen-year old 
daughter’s condition worsen.  The girl had been shaken and upset when Delia returned from the 
funeral on Monday, but no amount of coaxing or commanding could bring Lula to say what was 
wrong.  Now the girl’s fever increased and a series of convulsions wracked her young body.  In 
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desperation, Delia sent one of her other children running the three miles to Central to fetch Dr. T. 
W. Folger.  As they waited, Lula finally told her mother the whole story.  By then, the shock of 
the assault and the infection from the dirty cotton and the dried blood inside her had done their 
work.  When Folger arrived a quarter hour after Lula died, all he could do was determine a cause 
of death.  After noting the damage to the girl’s body, Folger concluded, ‘It is probable that she 
was ravished and possibly this is the cause of her death.’ 
 Black and white men crowded into Tom Watkins’s store, arranging themselves around 
the stove and leaning on the counter.  Ben Garvin, the forty-year old farmer and trial justice who 
was temporarily serving as coroner swore in fourteen men as a coroner’s jury to account for Lula 
Sherman’s death.  Among the jurors were both white men from Central, such as Gaylord Eaton 
and James Rowland, and black men, including Andy Crooks and Hamp Forrester.  The jury 
heard testimony from Lula’s parents and T. W. Folger and concluded that Lula had been raped 
and had died as a result, but it was not clear who might have committed the crime, so the jury 
adjourned for the day. 
 The next morning brought a break in the case.  Several new witnesses arrived to testify 
before the coroner’s jury, and many of them remembered seeing the same man close to the 
Sherman place during the time that Lula and her sister were alone there.  About eleven o’clock 
on Monday morning, a man that G. W. Miller, the Shermans’ landlord, recognized as Manse 
Waldrop visited him at his house, asking about renting some of his property.  He asked 
permission to hunt on the place, and Miller remembered being surprised that Waldrop had a gun 
with him, but no dog.  Two black men who lived in the neighborhood also saw Waldrop and 
testified that they saw him leaving between noon and one o’clock.  Mary Spearman, who lived 
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on the G. W. Miller place about a quarter mile from Cato Sherman’s house, saw Waldrop cross 
the creek and go past her house about noon, heading toward Cato Sherman’s. 
 Manse Waldrop was sent for and brought to Watkins’ store.  Although not much is 
known of Waldrop before the last day of his life, he appears to have been living on Francis J. 
Pelzer’s place just across the Anderson County line.  Pelzer was a Charleston merchant and a 
pioneering investor in upstate cotton mills, including the one on the Saluda River in Anderson 
County that bore his name.  After that mill was up and running in 1882, Pelzer purchased 
Ashtabula Plantation, which lies a mile or so toward Central from the town of Pendleton.17  One 
observer said Waldrop was ‘about 35 [years old] at least.’18  Waldrop got to Central in the 
afternoon, shortly after Lula Sherman was buried.  When Lula’s younger sister identified him, 
Manse Waldrop was charged with the rape and murder of Lula Sherman. 
 Plans for the lynching of Manse Waldrop began almost before the inquest for Lula 
Sherman was finished.  Cato Sherman, Lula’s father, and several other black men from the 
neighborhood were present.  One of these men, Harrison Heyward, was apparently the first to 
say that Waldrop ought to be hanged.  A comment like that, suggesting violence toward a white 
man, might have been dangerous for a black man to make, but under the circumstances, with 
outrage, grief, and anger running high, it passed.  And it might have remained but an idle 
comment had Gaylord Eaton not been present.  Eaton, who was white, had been a member of the 
coroner’s jury and, according to several people present, had been drinking that Friday.  David E. 
Garvin, the constable, asked Eaton to help transport the prisoner to Pickens.  Eaton agreed 
readily, and as he was tying Waldrop up, he told the prisoner, ‘That rope will break your neck.’  
Three different times he said that he would put the rope around Waldrop’s neck himself ‘if he 
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could get two or three Negroes to help him.’  More than once he also stated that they were going 
toward the jail in Pickens, but they would never get there with the prisoner.  As Eaton and 
Garvin left Watkins’s store with Waldrop, to head toward Central, Eaton hid a rope underneath 
his coat. 
 After Waldrop was carried away, the men remaining at the store considered what to do.  
Harrison Heyward, Cato Sherman, and some of the other black men began to discuss lynching 
Waldrop.  After all, Gaylord Eaton–a white man–seemed to be in favor of a lynching.  Bill 
Williams, a black railroad worker, asked Tom Watkins what would happen to them if they 
hanged Waldrop.  ‘It would be just the same as if I were to shoot you,’ Watkins replied.  ‘It 
would be taking the law in your own hands.’  Such a message could be understood in several 
ways.  It could be a warning against committing any violence.  But Watkins was white and 
Williams was black, so it could have meant that hanging Waldrop would bring down no more 
harsh response than if a white man shot a black man.  Heyward later testified that Watkins said 
‘what ever you do don’t have any white men in it,’ another subtle encouragement to lynching 
and a suggestion that local white opinion would support whatever the black men chose to do. 
 When Waldrop arrived in Central, Eaton and Garvin  seemed to feel it was best to carry 
the prisoner on to Pickens that night to the safety of the jail.  Rumors of the threatened lynching, 
however, were already circulating in Central, and at least three people tried to talk Eaton and 
Garvin out of taking Waldrop to Pickens.  One man even offered to keep the prisoner in his 
home with a guard on him rather than risk the road at night.  Eaton was eager to get going and 
declared that he was going to set out walking to Pickens with the prisoner.  Garvin convinced 
Eaton to at least wait in the telegraph office while he got a buggy from the livery stable.  Folger 
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suggested going by way of Symm’s Mill since there was already a mob on the main road. 
 But mob or no mob, Eaton and Garvin set out toward Pickens on the main road with 
Waldrop riding in the buggy alongside them.  As the trio rode north, Garvin saw a few men in 
the road, then a few more.  He whipped the mule to outrun them and made it another few 
hundred yards before encountering a mob of another dozen men in the road.  Realizing he could 
never make it to Pickens without losing Waldrop, Garvin wheeled the buggy around to return to 
the relative safety of Central.  But he could not escape the mob, and after a few hundred yards, 
men caught up and stopped the buggy.  They dragged Waldrop out and over the hill. 
 At this point, everyone heard several pistol shots.  Folger and two other men had already 
been heading toward the scene and managed to catch up with the mob, getting between the men 
and Waldrop.  Waldrop seemed shaken and had been shot in the head, although he was only 
grazed.  For a moment, it appeared that the lynching had been averted, and Waldrop got up and 
began walking back towards town.  But three or four men rushed past Folger and the others and 
grabbed him again, ordering Folger and the other white men, who were unarmed, to leave.  The 
next morning Waldrop’s body was found hanging from a small tree near the road. 
 On Saturday morning, 31 Dec. 1887, the coroner empaneled another jury, this time to 
find out how Manse Waldrop had died.  Perhaps because the acting coroner had little experience 
but more likely because of the unusual and potentially inflammatory nature of the case, the 
solicitor for the district, James L. Orr, Jr., arrived to take charge of the investigation.  Within four 
days, the coroner’s jury had concluded that Waldrop had ‘come to his death near Central in 
Pickens County by being hanged with a rope’ and went on to name several suspects.  Five black 
men–Harrison Heyward, Cato Sherman, Bill Williams, Henry Bolton, and John Reese–were 
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arrested and charged with murder.  They made it safely to Pickens and took up residence in the 
county jail.  Gaylord Eaton was also arrested, but he was charged with the lesser crime of 
accessory to murder before the fact.  Eaton had the resources to hire two of Pickens’s best 
attorneys, and by 7 Jan. 7, 1888, he was released on five thousand dollars bond. 
 The legal proceedings at the beginning of the case suggest that much more was going on 
than meets the eye, and we can only partially untangle the actions and motivations by reading the 
court journal.19  The five black defendants were represented by R. W. Simpson of Pendleton, a 
prominent Confederate veteran and attorney.  The case had made headlines around the region, 
and African Americans across the state did what they could to help.  In Charleston, Samuel J. 
Lee, an African American attorney and Speaker of the House of Representatives during 
Reconstruction, helped raise funds for the black lynchers’ defense.  Lee and the Charleston group 
even sent a black lawyer to Pickens, but after speaking with the defendants’ counsel, he 
concluded that outside counsel was not needed.20  A grand jury convened in Pickens on 16 Jan. 
1888, with Judge Joseph J. Norton presiding over the Court of General Sessions.  The grand jury 
indicted Bill Williams, Cato Sherman, Henry Bolton, John Reese, and Harrison Heyward for 
murder, but they also indicted Gaylord Eaton for murder (not simply for accessory before the 
fact) and indicted one other African American mob member, Foster Knox.  In their final 
presentment, the grand jury seemed to tie problems with liquor in Central to the recent violence.  
After presenting indictments against two Central men for retailing whiskey, the grand jury stated, 
‘From information derived and obtained by us we do verily believe that D. E. Garvin, T. W. 
Folger, Aleck Anderson, Richard McCorde and Green Roberts are accessories to the murder of 
Manse Waldrop alias Gooden, and we would recommend that the Solicitor exert himself–use all 
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his means–and exhaust every effort to secure proof against the parties named, and bring them to 
trial.’  Judge Norton granted the defense a continuance until July to give them time to prepare 
their case.21 
 The five black lynching defendants returned to the Pickens jail to wait.  Since the jail was 
wooden, no fire was allowed in their upstairs cell.  The men stayed warm by pacing back and 
forth and kept their spirits up by singing ‘Come to Jesus’ and other hymns.  When the case came 
to trial in July, Folger and the others against whom indictments were sought by the original 
grand jury were discharged.22  The original six defendants all plead not guilty.  The court journal 
lists witnesses but gives no further details of what they testified, and newspaper accounts of the 
trial are not extant.  The State’s witnesses include many of the white citizens of Central who tried 
to prevent the lynching, while the defense witnesses are primarily family members who could 
provide alibis for the defendants.  Curiously, Solicitor J. L. Orr was called as a witness for the 
defense.  The jury could not decide on a verdict, and the judge declared a mistrial.  The black 
defendants again returned to the Pickens jail.23 
 The case was not heard again until March 1889.  This time verdicts were reached: on 6 
Mar. 1889, Eaton, Sherman, and Reese were found not guilty, but Williams, Heyward, and 
Bolton were convicted.  Bolton requested and was granted a new trial and bail, probably because 
of the prejudicial effect of some hearsay evidence against him.  Judge Norton sentenced 
Williams and Heyward to hang on 5 Apr. 1889.24  As soon as the verdicts were announced, a 
massive clemency campaign began.  Petitions poured in from across the state, prominent citizens 
and politicians wrote to the governor, and a group of African American ministers met with 
Governor John P. Richardson to ask him to grant clemency to Williams and Heyward.25  
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Richardson delayed the execution and eventually granted the two men full pardons.26  
Richardson’s pardons illustrate an important point about the timing of this case.  Richardson was 
one of the Bourbon governors of South Carolina in the decade and a half after the end of 
Reconstruction.  While there were steady encroachments on black political rights during this 
period, politicians such as Richardson countenanced black political participation, and were 
therefore somewhat responsive to their needs and opinions, in a way unimaginable just two years 
later after Ben Tillman’s more virulent brand of racism had gained political supremacy in South 
Carolina.27 
 The lynching of Manse Waldrop posed a dilemma for southern whites as the fact that the 
mob members had been identified and arrested set two important principles in white folk justice 
against one another.28  On the one hand, it was important not to legitimize the practice of black 
men killing white men.  Yet, as much as whites wanted to discourage black violence directed 
against whites, they certainly did not want to establish the precedent that mobs who lynched to 
avenge sexual assaults should be brought to justice and punished.  The situation posed a related 
set of dilemmas for African Americans.  In a period when a decline in political power made 
African Americans increasingly vulnerable to violence of all sorts, some African Americans 
supported the idea that a black patriarch had as much right to defend and avenge his dependents 
as did a white patriarch.  It was this idea of equal justice that underlay many of the appeals to 
spare the lynchers’ lives that came from African American petitioners: it was simply wrong, they 
argued, to execute two black men for a crime that white men were never even brought to trial for.  
At the same time, it was clear that African Americans were disproportionately the victims of 
mob violence, and sanctioning lynching could not but strengthen the hand of the white lynching 
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supporters who would turn the practice against black victims. 
 These arguments began to emerge within hours of Waldrop’s lynching.  The first 
statement came from the doctor who had examined Lula Sherman’s body.  Even though T. W. 
Folger had every reason to be outraged at Waldrop’s crime, he had been one of the voices of 
reason the night of the lynching, urging the constable to wait till morning before moving the 
prisoner to the Pickens jail.  Folger even offered to help stand guard over Waldrop at the town’s 
hotel, and when the mob seized Waldrop near Folger’s house, he and another white citizen 
rushed out to plead with the mob to spare the man’s life.  Unsuccessful, Folger was one of the 
first on the scene the next morning to discover Waldrop’s body.  As deeply involved in the 
incident as he was, it is not surprising that Folger would have had a comment on the lynching.  In 
a letter to a local newspaper, he argued that lynching was the only appropriate response to sexual 
assault.  While the citizens of Central ‘cannot but condemn the violence,’ Folger wrote, ‘still 
they think that if ever a case of lynching was justifiable, this is the one.’  Beyond the specifics of 
this case, Folger hoped Waldrop’s fate might quiet those who criticized lynching:  ‘To all 
thinking men, it seems to me, that this will show the ‘bloody shirt’ men of New England that the 
negro can lynch the white perpetrator of crime with as much impunity as can his Caucassian 
brother lynch the negro.’29 
 Folger was hardly alone in condoning the lynching and opposing punishment for the 
lynchers on the basis of equal treatment at law.  Several dozen residents of Central signed a 
petition that argued, ‘We are opposed to lynch law but it is a recognized fact that no white man 
has ever been convicted in South Carolina for this offence, and it would seem to us to be unfair 
and unjust to hang these poor negroes, even if guilty, for simply following the advice & example 
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of their white fellow citizens.’30  Another petition from Pickens County stated unequivocally that 
Waldrop was guilty and was rumored to have committed other rapes.  It went on to argue that the 
testimony against the lynchers was weak, but most importantly, since whites were not convicted 
for lynching, Heyward and Williams should not be executed.31  As the Charleston newspaper 
argued when the lynching trial was beginning, ‘The effect [of the lynching] cannot well be other 
than salutary, as one of the best ways to meet and overcome an evil is by demonstrating that it 
will work both ways and operate against those who have been accustomed to be judges as well as 
against those who have been wont to be adjudged.’32 
 Samuel Dibble, a white politician from Orangeburg in the South Carolina Low Country, 
suggested in a letter to Governor John P. Richardson that lynching to avenge rape was justifiable, 
whatever the racial identities of the persons involved.33  Dibble began with the assumption that 
Waldrop was guilty of the crime with which he was charged.  He argued that convicting only two 
of the six defendants would not send a clear message anyway.  Black men and white men, argued 
Dibble, are equal before the law, and the courts should not discriminate ‘based on the race or 
color of the outraged victim, the ravisher, or the lynchers.’  Hanging Williams and Heyward 
would be wrong in principle, and it also ‘would be disastrous in its consequences to that race 
especially, which has the most to suffer, in cases of outrageous assault.’  Dibble argues, in effect, 
that since protecting white women from rape (presumably by black men) was so important, the 
judicial system should never punish men who lynched to avenge rape, even if that meant 
sometimes allowing black men who killed white men to go free. 
 Perhaps the most extreme response to the entire situation came from the judge who 
condemned Heyward and Williams.  Joseph  J. Norton was a Confederate veteran and a resident 
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of Walhalla in neighboring Oconee County.  He had just begun his career as a judge when he 
found himself with the Waldrop case.34  Afterwards, Norton wrote to Governor Richardson to 
explain that the jury may have thought that a recommendation of mercy would spare the lives of 
Heyward and Williams.  Norton felt bound by the law to impose the death penalty after Heyward 
and Williams were convicted of premeditated murder, but he was willing to explain to 
Richardson that the jurors probably never intended for the defendants to hang and may well have 
rendered a different verdict had they realized their recommendation for mercy would be ignored.  
In an attempt to avoid this sort of conflict in the future, Norton suggested to Richardson that he 
recommend to the General Assembly that they make ‘lynching for rape an additional ground for 
declaring a homicide excusable.’35  Though it seems a huge leap backwards in jurisprudence, 
Norton’s suggestion was in line with the responses by Folger, Dibble, and others who supported 
the principle of lynching in response to sexual assault and felt that race should not be an issue in 
such calculations.  Fortunately for South Carolina, Governor Richardson and the General 
Assembly did not act on this suggestion. 
 Other observers sought to make a racial distinction in the use of lynching.  A few days 
after the lynching, several dozen Central residents met to draft a statement opposing the 
lynching.  They said, in part, ‘lynch law . . . in the hands of the negro race is a widely different 
thing from lynch law in the hands of the whites.  The latter have always used it as a corrective 
and preventive of the highest and most revolting crimes, and even then in a decent or orderly 
way.  The latter, once adopting it with impunity, from their nature and training, are likely to use 
it for revenge or a spirit of reckless lawlessness.’36 
 Some people commenting on the Waldrop lynching found a way to excuse the lynching 
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and avoid setting the precedent of executing lynchers, but to do so without supporting the idea 
that black men might legitimately lynch white men for victimizing black women.  Writing in 
support of a petition prepared by some of the black citizens of the Georgetown area, state senator 
Richard Dozier acknowledged the assault on Lula Sherman.37  Waldrop’s lynchers, however, had 
acted ‘from an ignorant zeal to imitate their white brethren in the preservation of the virtue of 
their women.’  Dozier argues that they ‘only grasp the general idea contained in the measure of 
redress, without ability to discriminate and differentiate according to the facts in any given case.’  
They were, at any rate, only following the lead of the whites since ‘the public sentiment of the 
State as expressed through the Press, I believe without a dissenting voice, had so thoroughly 
approved of lynching for this particular offence up to the time of the lynching in Pickens County, 
that it was not at all surprising that the colored people should have felt themselves justified in 
resorting to the same remedy.’  Although Dozier comes close to repeating the argument that 
blacks should be treated equally before the law, at least to the extent of not being executed for a 
crime whites were never indicted for, he gives it a significantly different cast by the claim that 
blacks did not really understand what they were doing and were simply imitating whites. 
 In these explanations we can see the outlines of the scientific racism that was taking 
shape at this time.  This new view held that with the civilizing influences of slavery removed, 
African Americans were regressing to a state of barbarism as bad or worse than that they had left 
in Africa.  A leading thinker in this movement was Nathaniel Southgate Shaler, who argued that 
the way blacks had improved under slavery was by imitating whites.38  Little wonder, then, that 
African Americans who had become more civilized by imitating whites might indulge in one of 
the whites’ least civilized habits by a similar process of imitation. 
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 What the Central residents and Dozier were both at pains to make clear is that what 
justifies lynching is the genuine sense of uncontrollable outrage white men feel when a black 
man rapes a white woman.  Foes of lynching and later historians have been perhaps too quick to 
dismiss this explanation as a disingenuous rationalization, a smokescreen for the ‘true’ motives 
of lynching (sheer race prejudice, controlling black labor, or controlling white women are only a 
few possibilities).  It is crucial that we understand the argument Dozier makes on its own terms 
because it is precisely this argument that allows white supporters of lynching to craft a discourse 
justifying the practice solely as a tool of racial subordination.  Lynchings, of course, would 
happen with or without logical defenses of the practice, but Dozier’s argument is what provided 
supporters of lynching with a way to justify the practice to a public–South and North–that may 
have balked at a raw explanation of lynching as a way to control black labor or to keep 
disorderly white women in their places. 
 Ideas about gender and race were changing in the late nineteenth century.  As historian 
Gail Bederman argues, the nineteenth century’s ideal of ‘manliness,’ with its emphasis on self-
control, was beginning to incorporate aspects of ‘masculinity,’ the qualities that all men shared 
as a result of their sex.  Manliness was the foundation of the middle class: a manly man could 
exercise self-control over his natural passions in order to succeed in business and establish a 
tranquil home.  Collectively, the qualities of manliness provided the basis for civilization.  These 
ideals were being challenged by other kinds of men who did not rely on self-control and 
manliness for their sense of what a man should be.  By the late nineteenth century, there were 
fears that the stresses of modern life were proving too much for middle-class men, leading to 
‘neurasthenia.’  Less civilized men did not suffer from this condition since their very 
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primitiveness kept them from suffering from the strains of the modern world.39 
 These fears about the debilitating effects of too much civilization on the very manliness 
that had led to civilization were compounded by fears that primitive men (workers and anyone 
not white) were themselves a threat to civilization in various ways.  But the discourse around the 
emotions of ‘outrage’ white men felt in response to the rape of white women that led them to 
lynch provided a way to save civilization by modifying manliness, leavening it with a healthy 
dose of primitive masculinity.  It was precisely the white man’s ability to feel strong emotions, 
an effect of his greater civilization and what made him vulnerable to neurasthenia, that made it 
possible for feelings of outrage to overcome him when a white woman was assaulted.  This 
emotional response could easily overpower the white man’s manly self-control and ability to 
abide by laws and civilized legal forms, leading to lynching as an uncontrollable result.  In this 
scheme of things, the potential weakness brought about by the refinements of civilization had a 
built-in safety valve: it could trigger the latent savagery and strength lying beneath the surface of 
every white man’s skin.  If overdeveloped emotions were an unavoidable product of increasing 
civilization, then the lynchings that resulted were excusable.  In fact, the notion that genuinely 
uncontrollable outrage prompted lynchings provided a rationale to explain how lynchings could 
increase in frequency at the same time that the world was, presumably, becoming ever more 
civilized. 
 Finally, some white observers found a way out of the intellectual dilemma posed by the 
Waldrop lynching by arguing that the situation did not meet the basic requirements for a 
legitimate lynching.  Shortly after the lynching, the Keowee Courier in the nearby town of 
Walhalla published an editorial that took the position that Lula Sherman did not qualify as a 
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victim worthy of being avenged by lynching.40  Lynch law, writes the editor, is wrong in itself.  
However, some crimes are so revolting that vengeance cannot be stayed.  ‘Of these crimes,’ the 
editorial continues, ‘fiendish and brutal violence to respectable women is the highest.’  
Protection of such women is a hallmark of Anglo-Saxon, Christian civilization, and ‘summary 
punishment of a brute, black or white, who assaults a pure woman, we cannot condemn.’  Thus 
far, it would seem the Keowee Courier should support the Waldrop lynching.  Certainly Lula 
Sherman, at age fourteen, if not ‘respectable,’ could certainly have qualified as ‘pure,’ and the 
assault on her as ‘fiendish and brutal violence.’  However, the Keowee Courier presents Waldrop 
in the most sympathetic possible light. 
 The most important shift comes when the editorial suggests that in a case such as that at 
Central ‘the standing of the assailed should be considered.’  The editorial claims that blacks do 
not value women as whites do.41  Therefore, the editorial reasons, an assault on a black woman 
cannot create the genuine feeling of outrage that an assault on a white woman creates. The 
distinction between genuine and false outrage is important, because lynching for rape was 
justified as a natural, instinctive reflex response to the sense of outrage that a man of honor felt 
when a woman under his protection was violated.  If this bond of protection was weak or invalid, 
then it could not legitimately provoke the sort of outrage that would take control of an otherwise 
steady and stable mind and lead it to murder. Continuing to hammer the point home, the editorial 
closes with the claim that ‘assaults on negro women by whites have been of rare occurrence.’ 
 An even more extreme form of this argument was made by the grand jury of Pickens 
County meeting on 16 Jan. 1888, after the lynching.42  Their presentment claimed ‘that the death 
of Lula Sherman was not caused by rape or attempt to ravish, but from diseases particular to 
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females and a severe whipping administered by the mother of the said Lula Sherman on Monday 
before her death on Thursday, which will fully account for the bruises on her person.’   Waldrop, 
or any other possible rapist, does not even enter this picture.  By blaming Lula's death on 
‘diseases peculiar to females,’ the grand jury is asserting that Lula Sherman was sexually mature 
and therefore, probably, sexually active as well, not a chaste girl whose rape and murder might 
justify lynching.  If the grand jury sincerely believed that Delia Sherman's whipping contributed 
to the death of her daughter, it is odd that they did not issue a warrant for her arrest. 
 The shift of the grand jury’s attention from Waldrop to his victim helps us place this case 
in the broader context of a debate in the South about how women would be protected, who would 
protect them, and which women were or were not worth protecting.  When Lula Sherman was 
raped and Manse Waldrop was lynched, the public response to rape was in flux, and it was not 
entirely clear that white men would be able to direct that response.  During Reconstruction, 
African American and poor white women had taken advantage of the new political 
circumstances to demand their right to protection from rape.43  In 1885, the Women’s Christian 
Temperance Union (WCTU) launched a major campaign to reform rape laws directed against the 
actions of white men.44  The WCTU’s campaign worked to raise the legal ‘age of consent’ so 
that prosecutions for rape would be made easier since men could not make a woman’s character 
an issue.45  This campaign was ‘part of a sweeping, nationwide sex reform campaign inaugurated 
in 1885 by the national WCTU.’46  Although the campaign in the South did not target forcible 
rape as directly as it had been challenged a few years earlier in the courts on an ad hoc basis, 
‘challenging white men’s sexual prerogatives . . . entailed confronting white men’s political 
hegemony.’47  A more vigorous attack on white rapists was deflected when white Southern men 
  27 
were able to turn public attention away from white rapists and toward the specter of black men 
raping white women. 
 The antirape campaign of the mid-1880s held out the possibility of racial equality; under 
the laws the WCTU sought, both white and black women would be protected from both white 
and black men.  Had such laws been passed, Lula Sherman would have been defined by law as 
being incapable of consenting to sex, making Waldrop’s actions automatically criminal.  Without 
such laws, a more flexible standard defined her status.  As historian Martha Hodes has pointed 
out, the idea of ‘the purity of white women was . . . dependent upon images of black women as 
depraved,’ images that were carried over from the days of slavery, when black women had no 
hope of legal protection from rape.48  By manipulating the ways in which different women were 
defined as virtuous or not, white men were able to control the consensus about which rape 
victims deserved to be protected or avenged.  Lynching as vengeance for rape thus became an 
alternative to reforming rape laws.  This alternative kept the control of punishment for rape in the 
hands of white men and kept it within the communities and households they dominated.  White 
women were forced into what historian Jacquelyn Dowd Hall has described as  ‘the trade-off 
implicit in the code of chivalry, for the right of the southern lady to protection presupposed her 
obligation to obey.’49  The obvious exception to this was the Waldrop lynching, and it is the 
exceptional nature of this situation that impelled white men to turn what Martha Hodes describes 
as ‘a convenient ideological somersault to justify their own access to black women while 
furiously denouncing sex between black men and white women on the grounds of racial 
purity.’50 
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 The lynching of Manse Waldrop and its aftermath turned out to be much more 
complicated than those involved initially thought it would be.  Bill Williams, Cato Sherman, 
Gaylord Eaton, Harrison Heyward, and the other men who dragged Waldrop into the woods to 
die saw what they were doing as the simple application of commensurate and certain punishment 
to an offender who had committed an act so terrible that the courts could not be trusted to 
respond adequately.  They were just avenging a fourteen-year old girl.  But as the editor of the 
Keowee Courier pointed out later, ‘the standing of the assailed’ made all the difference.  This 
example of ‘lynch law reversed’ makes certain conclusions about lynching easier to discern than 
they might be in the usual configuration. 
 Although opposition to lynching would become a central plank of the civil rights 
platform in the twentieth century, it would be a mistake to read that opposition to the practice as 
something monolithic or inevitable.  Many African Americans (and many whites, for that matter) 
always opposed lynching for a variety of reasons, but in the 1880s and even after, many African 
Americans could also support the practice.  Even though they were living in a society in which 
laws as written and enforced operated differentially on whites and blacks, some African 
Americans certainly did subscribe to the same idea of retributive justice that animated whites 
when they chose to lynch.  Lynching became a racialized phenomenon, but that was a historical, 
contingent development, not an inevitability.  We should turn our attention to a more thorough 
understanding of why African Americans participated in lynchings, either alone or with whites, 
and set these explanations in a framework that accounts for changes in African Americans’ 
attitudes toward lynching. 
 The almost silent role of Lula Sherman in this story should also remind us that there is 
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still much to know about the role of African American women as the victims of sexual 
exploitation and violence by white men and the relationship of that experience to lynching.  
Recent work has begun to consider black women as the direct victims of lynching, but more 
work is needed to complete our picture of black women as ‘collateral victims’ of lynching as 
well.  While in this one exceptional case, the sexual violence against a black girl led to the 
lynching of a white man, it was probably much more common that the result was either nothing 
or the death of a black man who attempted to avenge her.  In a world where white men felt 
empowered to exercise sexual domination over black women in a last shadow of a slaveholder’s 
perquisites and where ideas about masculinity and race were in flux, it would be amazing had 
black women not found themselves caught up in the lynching of black men both directly and 
indirectly.  As we work to hone our understanding of the rape-lynch complex, we must find a 
way to factor sexual violence against black women into our equations, but to do so in a way that 
respects contingency and developments over time.  When we write histories of lynching, we 
need to be able to explain how a mob of mostly African American men in 1887 could feel fairly 
confident that they acted with the support of their community–black and white alike–when they 
lynched a white man for an assault on a black girl and why ten years later, this would seem 
unimaginable. 
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